Traditionally, the most common game-theoretic model of the Soviet-US nuclear arms race has been an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. According to such a model, on any given trial both superpowers are better off arming regardless of what the other side chooses, but if both sides arm the outcome is less desirable than had both sides reduced their supply of weapons. Although Soviet and US preferences resembled a Prisoner's Dilemma throughout much of the Cold War, recent evidence suggests that the arms race is now more accurately modeled by a 'Perceptual Dilemma'. In a Perceptual Dilemma, both sides: (1) prefer mutual arms reductions to all other outcomes; (2) want above all to avoid disarming while the other side arms; and (3) perceive the other side as preferring unilateral armament to all other outcomes. This article presents empirical evidence that the nuclear arms race is more appropriately modeled by a Perceptual Dilemma than by a Prisoner's Dilemma, including new survey data in which members of the Australian Parliament and the Israeli Knesset were asked to estimate the preferences of Soviet and US leaders. The paper concludes by reviewing several factors which sustain misperception and by suggesting that a Perceptual Dilemma can be solved with a clear, time-limited series of disarmament initiatives.
Background
The 1980s: No decade in the history of Soviet-US relations ended so differently than it began. Gone were US pronouncements about 'the focus of evil in the modern world'. Gone were Soviet pronouncements about 'imperialist aggressors'. By the close of 1989, George Bush had remarked of Mikhail Gorbachev, 'You get the feeling he really wants to work with us', and by 1990 the United States and the Soviet Union had joined in a military coalition to oppose the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait. The wheel had nearly turned full circle.
Although these changes are of immense political and economic importance, their most profound significance rests in how they have transformed the nuclear arms race between the superpowers. It is this transformation -from bitter conflict to tentative coop- arms race are probably not at great variance with the true objectives pursued by each government. First, policy statements intended for public or foreign consumption have tended to be consistent with statements intended for private or domestic audiences (Frei, 1986; Halloran, 1988; Jackson, 1981; MccGwire, 1987; McConnell, 1985) . Second, content analyses have often found a significant correspondence between public declarations and superpower behavior (Axelrod & Zimmerman, 1981; Hermann, 1980; Tetlock, 1985; Zimmerman & Palmer, 1983 (Plous, 1985 (Plous, , 1987 (Plous, , 1988 . In a Perceptual Dilemma, the prevailing leaders in both superpowers: (1) prefer arms reductions to all other outcomes, (2) want above all to avoid disarming while the other side arms and (3) perceive the other side as most preferring unilateral armament. Because each side believes that its own disarmament is an invitation for the other side to arm -even though both actually prefer arms reductions -the result is an arms race. Moreover, because neither side has a desire to arm, both interpret the arms race as confirming evidence that the other side wishes to arm (cf. Jervis, 1976) .
The Perceptual Dilemma differs from the Prisoner's Dilemma in several critical respects. Unlike the Prisoner's Dilemma, in which both sides ideally prefer unilateral armament, each party in a Perceptual Dilemma prefers arms reductions to all other outcomes, but is prevented from disarming by the perception that the other side favors unilateral armament. In game-theoretic terms, this perception is modeled by granting each party a separate payoff matrix that contains preferences for itself and preferences perceived to be held by the other side. It is only by joining these two matrices, or halves, that a Perceptual Dilemma is formed.
In contrast to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, which has no stable solution and has a dominating strategy to arm, a Perceptual Dilemma can be solved when either side persuades the other that it truly desires mutual reductions more than unilateral armament. For example, if Soviet leaders were convinced that the 'payoffs' in Table  III represented US preferences, and if they  viewed mutual arms reductions as more  desirable than unilateral armament, little reason would remain to continue the nuclear arms race. In a Perceptual Dilemma, the key question is how to convince each side of the other's true preferences. 
The US Half of a Perceptual Dilemma
Rather than initially assessing the policy preferences held by each party to a conflict and later studying the obtained preference structure, virtually all game research begins by assuming that a particular preference structure represents a given conflict. A recent review of empirical game research yielded only one published account in which the participants in a conflict were directly surveyed about the desirability of various options (Plous, 1985 'All attempts to achieve military superiority over the USSR will be unavailing. The Soviet Union will never allow this' (Yuri V. Andropov, Pravda, 3127183, p. 1).
'Our country does not seek [nuclear] superiority, but it also will not allow superiority to be gained over it' (Konstantin U. Chernenko, Pravda, 4/9/84, pp. 1-2).
'We will in no event allow the US to obtain military superiority over us' (Mikhail S. Gorbachev, 11/22/85, Pravda, p. 1).
'The Soviet Union lays no claim to greater security than that enjoyed by others, but it will not settle for less' (Mikhail S. Gorbachev Soviet writers who specialize in international security affairs (cf. Bykov, 1980; Lebedev, 1986; Luzin, 1981; Ponomarev, 1985; Trofimenko, 1986 In keeping with this logic, a mail survey of the Australian Parliament was conducted in late 1986. The Australian Parliament was chosen for several reasons: (1) Given that Australia is aligned with the United States, Australian perceptions concerning the Soviet desire for arms reductions would presumably provide a conservative estimate of true Soviet desires; (2) because Australia is not a member of the NATO alliance, Australian leaders would be relatively free to express their opinions concerning superpower objectives and the nuclear arms race; (3) by surveying parliament members rather than citizens, any differences with survey responses from the US Senate would not be attributable to discrepancies in 'mass' and 'elite' opinion; and (4) with 224 members, the Australian Parliament would be large enough to generate a statistically meaningful sample of respondents.4
Patterned after the earlier survey of the US Senate, the Australian survey began by asking respondents to rate four hypothetical alternatives from -10 to +10 in terms of how desirable they would be for Australia: (1) The USA and the USSR both make significant nuclear weapons reductions; (2) the USA makes significant nuclear weapons reductions and the USSR continues on its present course; (3) the USSR makes significant nuclear weapons reductions and the USA continues on its present course; and (4) the USA and the USSR both continue on their present course. The instructions emphasized that these options were necessarily oversimplified, but asked respondents to make their best judgement given such limitations. After respondents rated how desirable each of the four scenarios would be for Australia, they were then asked to 'answer the same four questions taking the perspective of US political leaders estimating the consequences for the United States'. Finally, respondents were asked to evaluate the alternatives from the perspective of Soviet political leaders.
Seventy-four of the 224 parliament members responded to the survey request. Of these 74 parliament members, 9 declined to participate or failed to provide adequate information, and 65 completed the survey form. Although a final return rate of 29% is ordinarily quite low, this level of return is typical for surveys of national leaders (cf. Plous, 1985) . Moreover, demographics for the sample did not differ significantly from overall figures for the Parliament. Of the 61 respondents who provided demographic information, 52% were members of the Labor Party, exactly the same as the Parliament at large; 31% were members of the Liberal Party, compared with 33% of the entire Parliament; 8% were members of the National Party, compared with 12% in general; and 9% were Independents or Australian Democrats, compared with 4% of the total Parliament. Eighty-seven percent were male and 13% female, compared with 90% and 10% of the entire Parliament, and the mean age of respondents was 47 years (SD = 7.9), compared with 49 years (SD = 8.7) for the Parliament as a whole. While these statistics alone cannot establish the sample as representative, the striking correspondence between sample and population on several different dimensions is certainly encouraging. alternative for Australia (M = +7.4). During the summer of 1987, a mail survey was sent to all 120 members of the Israeli Knesset. The Israeli survey was similar in format to the Australian survey, except that it was typeset in Hebrew and included a coding system on the back of each survey to allow for respondent identification (though the survey was not explicitly anonymous, respondents were not asked to identify themselves).6 Thirty-seven of the 120 Knesset members responded to the survey request: 3 declined to participate, 1 did not provide adequate information, and 33 completed the survey form. Although a return rate of 28% is low by conventional standards, the sample appeared to be quite representative of the Knesset. For example, 41% of the respondents were members of the Likud Party, compared with 34% of the total Knesset; 41% were members of the Labor Party, compared with 33% of the entire Knesset; and 19% were members of other parties, compared with 33% of the full Knesset.7 Table IX These findings confirm that Israeli respondents were indeed more pro-US and/or antiSoviet than the Australian respondents.
Respondents did not view unilateral US
Once again, however, Allied perceptions did not conform to the US half of a Perceptual Dilemma -or even to a Prisoner's Dilemma -but to the Soviet half of a Perceptual Dilemma. As shown in Table X Soviet leaders as preferring mutual weapons reductions and US leaders as preferring unilateral armament. Although advocates of the Prisoner's Dilemma might object that the present survey questions were so oversimplified as to be meaningless, it should be pointed out that the questions merely made explicit the logic which underpins game theory; to reject that logic is also to reject the Prisoner's Dilemma as a valid model of superpower conflict.
Proponents of the Prisoner's Dilemma might also claim that the Australian survey provided support for at least the US half of a Prisoner's Dilemma. While it is true that the Australian respondents perceived US leaders as preferring unilateral armament to mutual reductions, this support is undercut by survey data supplied directly from US senators and by the declarations contained in Tables IV, V, and VI. Furthermore, given the presumed tendency of Australian and Israeli leaders to underestimate the Soviet desire for mutual arms reductions and overestimate the Soviet desire for unilateral armament, it is unlikely that Soviet preferences conform to a Prisoner's Dilemma. Taken together with the evidence cited earlier, the present results suggest that Soviet preferences are more accurately reflected by a Perceptual Dilemma than by a Prisoner's Dilemma, and it remains for supporters of the Prisoner's Dilemma to furnish empirical evidence of its relevance to the nuclear arms race.8 
Factors That Sustain Misperception
If the nuclear arms race is better modeled as a Perceptual Dilemma than as a Prisoner's Dilemma, why do misperceptions between the superpowers persist? There are several answers to this question. In the first place, a static 2 x 2 model such as the Perceptual Dilemma does not take into account the history of superpower conflict. If the Soviet-US nuclear arms race shifted from a Prisoner's Dilemma in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s to a Perceptual Dilemma in the 1980s, then a more comprehensive approach would be to model the arms race dynamically as a supergame. Table XI depicts half of such a supergame. The 2 x 2 game furthest to the left constitutes a static Prisoner's Dilemma, but as the arms race proceeds the utility of additional armament declines and the game moves toward the right. When enough redundant, expensive, or destabilizing weapons are accumulated, the desirability of mutual arms reductions finally exceeds that of unilateral armament and the game is transformed from a Prisoner's Dilemma into a Perceptual Dilemma. In the course of such a transformation, however, each side's perceptions undoubtedly lag behind genuine changes in the other side's preferences. As Mikhail Gorbachev stated in 1985: 'Confidence cannot be restored at once. This is a difficult process. We were attentive to the American President's assurances that the US does not seek superiority and does not want a nuclear war. We sincerely hope that these statements will be borne out by deeds' (p. 1).
Unfortunately, even the best of deeds can be misinterpreted; cooperative actions carried out by one side are frequently overlooked or misconstrued by the other. Psychological research has shown that information which contradicts previous views is routinely discredited through biases in assimilation (cf. Lord et al., 1979) and that disconfirming evidence is typically undervalued relative to confirming evidence (Snyder & Cantor, 1979; Wason, 1966) . Research also suggests that positive behavior which violates prior expectations or comes from a disliked source tends to be explained as a result of situational demands, whereas positive behavior that confirms prior expectations or comes from a liked source is more often explained in terms of character (Holsti, 1969; Kulik, 1983; Regan et al., 1974) . As a consequence, cooperative gestures made by an adversary seldom lead to large changes in how that adversary is perceived. Moreover, experimental game research has shown that competitively disposed parties to a conflict often have difficulty detecting a cooperative orientation held by the other side (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Maki & McClintock, 1983 ).
Yet even when cooperative initiatives are accurately detected, beliefs are usually slow to change. Laboratory research has shown that social perceptions can survive a complete discrediting of the information on which they were originally based, even in cases involving minimal initial evidence (Anderson et al., 1980) . Several studies on Finally, misperceptions are reinforced within social and political communities. This factor is clear if the nuclear arms race is modeled not as a single supergame, but as a family of overlapping supergames in which each political leader is in a different location and is moving at a different speed (and possibly direction) within her or his supergame. Such a model would presumably result in the strengthening of commonly perceived elements. To take a simplified example, if at some point the United States were governed by two equally influential leaders, one whose perceptions conformed to a Perceptual Dilemma and one whose perceptions conformed to a Prisoner's Dilemma, then both leaders would at least agree that the Soviet Union preferred unilateral armament and that unilateral arms reductions by the United States must be avoided at all costs. Their disagreement over which alternative was best for the United States (mutual reductions or unilateral armament) would only come into play if the Soviet Union began to disarm, for it is only through an extended series of disarmament initiatives that either side can determine the other's preferences with confidence.
Of course, the foregoing is not to say that perceptions never change. Indeed, many 
